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COMMENTS
THE PATENT-ANTITRUST BALANCE: PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The patent and antitrust laws exist side by side, both concerned
with the promotion of commerce in the United States. The antitrust
laws1 accomplish this function by removing artificial market restraints
so that competition tends toward the ideal economic model for free
enterprise. In contrast, the patent laws 2 explicitly create artificial
market restraints. By granting a statutory monopoly to inventors for
a period of seventeen years, 3 they provide special inducement 4 for in-
vention and innovation over and above what the ideal economic model
would supply. The antitrust-patent spheres come in conflict when the
patent monopoly protecting the invention is used as a lever to provide
competitive superiority to the patentee's market. At this point, the
patented product is no longer covered by the limited exception created
by the patent laws and is therefore subject to full enforcement of the
1. The relevant antitrust laws are: Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970);
Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) ; Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a) (1),
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970). The text to these statutes is found in notes 9, 12 and
13, respectively, infra.
2. The relevant patent laws include: 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970), which provides in
pertinent part:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years . . . of the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States ....
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of
personal property.
3. One commentator has suggested that the patent laws actually have an adverse
effect on invention. First, because of the patent monopoly, many new ideas are not
applied so widely as they would be if freely available. Second, the patent monopoly
often forces competitors of the patentee to invest money in duplicative research to
find a non-infringing way to produce the same result. As a corollary, research is
inhibited in areas already occupied by existing patents, because the chances are slim of
finding a non-infringing result. Third, patents increase the cost of development be-
cause a certain amount must be diverted to developing around patents already held.
Turner, Patents, Antitrust and Innovation, 28 U. PiTT. L. Rlv. 151, 152 (1966).
4. In fact, the constitutional basis for patents is expressed in terms of an induce-
ment. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
(463)
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antitrust laws. Respective advocates of antitrust and patent principles
continuously disagree over the position of the line separating the scope
of the patent grant from practices falling outside its scope. Conse-
quently, there is a constant conflict existing between the two policies.
Some commentators have urged that there is no real conflict,8 ex-
cept where the patent monopoly is used to influence a market not covered
by the patent grant. It is submitted, however, that this approach begs
the question. It is the determination of just what is within the patent
grant that creates the controversy.
In the past, controversy existed over the very nature of a patent.
Patent advocates urged that patents were a form of property,0 while
some antitrust advocates urged that patents were merely "a privi-
lege . . . conditioned by a public purpose, ' 7 similar to a public utility.
Although the statute now provides expressly that patents are personal
property,8 the spirit of the opposing view is probably still reflected in
restrictions now urged on patents.
Problems are created by the specific wording of some of the anti-
trust and patent statutes. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits
monopolization of any relevant market,9 while the patent laws grant
the inventor a monopoly for 17 years.10 Section 2 also prohibits agree-
ments to monopolize, while the patent laws permit the patentee to enter
into exclusive license agreements with licensees of his choice." Section
3 of the Clayton Act,'2 which prohibits tying arrangements, has been
5. See, e.g., Oppenheim, The Patent-Antitrust Spectrum of Patent and Know-
How License Limitations: Accommodation? Conflict? or Antitrust Supremacy?, 15
IDEA 1 (1971), wherein the author states:
[Ilt may fairly be concluded that placed in proper perspective, the corpus of
judicial decisions dealing case-by--case with the interactions of patent and antitrust
public policies does not reveal substantial evidence of a trend toward undermining
judicial protection of the "hard core" of license limitations ancillary to the lawful
scope of the patent grant.
Id. at 1-2. See also THE ATT'Y GEN'L's NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 224 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE].
6. Justice Holmes once stated that patents were "property carried to the highest
degree of abstraction - a right in rem to exclude, without a physical object or
content." 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 53 (2d ed. M. Howe 1961).
7. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). This section provides in pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor ....
10. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970) provides:
The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner
grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to
the whole or any specified part of the United States.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) provides in part:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to lease
or make a sale or contract for sale of . . . commodities, whether patented or un-
patented . .. on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or pur-
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in the . . . commodities of a competitor or
competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract
for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/2
FEBRUARY 1972]
used to attack the patent practice of compulsory package licensing. In
addition, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,13 which pro-
hibits "unfair methods of competition," is applied against almost every
patent practice.
In the first third of the 20th century the patent advocates seemed
to hold a strong position, with the Supreme Court having approved
tying arrangements, 14 first sale price restrictions 15 and first sale terri-
torial restrictions.'" In the forties, however, the tide seemed to turn.
In several antitrust suits, the Court limited its earlier decisions uphold-
ing price restrictions,'17 and outlawed the pooling of patents by com-
petitors where the practice tended to monopolize.' 8 Patent rights might
have been limited even further, but the revisions to the Patent Code in
1952 retarded the judicial trend somewhat. Since 1952, the situation
has evidently stabilized - while the Court has outlawed cross licensing
agreements designed to suppress competition'9 and patent royalties which
extend past the expiration of the patent,20 it has also condoned volun-
tary package licensing.2'
Certain factors are now in motion which favor the antitrust posi-
tion. A White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy22 proposed that
a patent owner granting one license under his patent be required to
grant all financially qualified and respectable applicants a license under
terms "neither more restrictive nor less favorable" than the first license.2 3
Meanwhile, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has pro-
posed a "rule of necessity" in considering antitrust prosecution of patent
activities :
In considering whether to attack a particular licensing provision or
practice, we ask two fundamental questions. First, is the particular
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970) provides:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
14. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). After passage of section 3 of
the Clayton Act, the Court overruled Henry. Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
15. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). The holding of
General Electric has been considerably narrowed by later decisions. See note 79 infra.
16. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
17. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948). In this case the
Court outlawed price restrictions where the product contained both patented and
unpatented parts. In United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952), the
Court outlawed price restrictions imposed by a holding company on competitors who
pooled their patents in the holding company.
18. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
19. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
20. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). See notes 117-24 and accompany-
ing text infra.
21. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). See
notes 125-37 and accompanying text infra. For a more complete discussion of the
evolving judicial attitudes of the patent-antitrust conflict, see Wood, Patents, Antitrust
and Prima Facie Attitudes, 50 VA. L. REv. 571, 573-77 (1964).
22. ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION REPORT, No. 411, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT,
pt. II: WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY, May 27, 1969[hereinafter cited as WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE].
23. Id. at 22.
COMMENTS
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provision justifiable as necessary to the patentee's exploitation of
his lawful monopoly? Second, are there less restrictive alternatives
which are more likely to foster competition available to the patentee?
Where the answer to the first question is No, and to the second Yes,
we will consider bringing a case challenging the restriction involved.
24
This language is in marked contrast to the rule of reason test for patents
laid down in United States v. General Electric Co.25 which condoned
license provisions "normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary
reward for the patentee's monopoly. '26
This impetus for change has produced a state of uncertainty as to
the legality of patent practices in the business world. Businessmen are
extremely reluctant to engage in questionable activity where the pos-
sible penalties are criminal prosecution, treble damages in civil suits,27
nonenforceability of the patent,28 and accompanying adverse publicity
and public condemnation. Consequently, certain license practices here-
tofore believed legal, may be abandoned, thus depriving the patentee
of the use of his property. Unlike other property, the value of a patent
may perhaps only be realized by granting licenses under the patent,2 9
especially where the patentee does not have the physical facilities
himself to put the invention into mass production. Concededly, some
uncertainty must remain. Concrete rules applicable to every aspect of
patent licenses are undesireable in view of the need for flexibility where
business relations are involved.80 However, businessmen would be re-
24. McLaren, Patent Licenses and Antitrust Considerations, 13 IDEA 61, 63
(Conference Number 1969). See also Donnem, The Antitrust Attack on Restrictive
Patent License Provisions, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 749 (1969).
25. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
26. Id. at 490.
27. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides:
That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee.
28. One judicially imposed sanction for patent misuse is the nonenforceability
of the patent. See note 42 infra.
29. As one commentator has observed:
The right given to a patentee is one to exclude others, for a limited period,
from making, using or selling his invention. Yet, the value of such invention to
the general public will only be realized by use of such invention by the patentee
or by his permitting others to acquire the right to use the invention by purchase of,
or license under, the patent. It is upon such sale or licensing and the attaching
of ancillary restrictive conditions thereto that potential incompatibility or conflict
between the antitrust laws and the patent system arises.
Heyman, Patent Licensing and the Antitrust Laws - A Reappraisal at the Close
of the Decade, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 537 (1969).
30. Professor Oppenheim has noted:
[T]his yearning for certainty must be balanced against the need for flexibility,
two opposing forces which are as old as the process of law itself. We must be on
our guard against extension of the certainty of "per se" rules beyond their proper
bounds but we must also be reconciled to the imprecision of an antitrust policy
Rule of Reason applied to restraints beyond the rights of exclusion inherent in
the patent 'grant.
Oppenheim, supra note 5, at 2 (footnotes omitted).
466 [VOL. 17
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assured if a general standard were affirmed that would recognize the
legality of certain well-defined types of licensing arrangements.
While the restraint imposed by the license agreement applies only
to matters within the patent grant, it is posited that the Antitrust Divi-
sion's rule of necessity is inappropriate in that it fails to take into account
the special treatment accorded patents under the patent laws. The
standard for validity suggested by this Comment - one very similar
to the test of General Electric - is whether the restraint is made to
secure for the patentee the pecuniary reward of his patent, as opposed
to whether it is used for other ends8 ' such as favoring one competitor
over another. So long as he is acting to secure his pecuniary reward,
the patentee need not justify his conduct by showing that there is no
other less restrictive alternative open to him. Where, however, the re-
straint is extended to areas outside the patent grant, as in a license re-
quiring grant-backs, 3 2 then the announced rule of necessity should
apply because in that instance the patentee no longer can claim the
special treatment of the patent laws, and he must justify as necessary
to the enjoyment of his patent the resultant restraint on competition.
This Comment will explore specific aspects of licensing now under
challenge, apply the general principles announced above to these specific
situations, and propose statutory modifications measuring the validity
of patent activity by these standards.
II. PROPOSALS
A. Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Dealing
At the present time a patentee has the unqualified statutory right
to decide whom he will license.3 3 Inasmuch as a patent is a form of
personal property, 34 this provision is a reflection of the constitutional
31. See Wood, supra note 21, at 593. See also Note, Regulation of Patent License
Royalty Rates Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Micii. L. REv. 1631, 1637 (1967).
32. See notes 93-108 and accompanying text infra.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970) provides in pertinent part that "the ...patentee ...
may ...grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent ....
This has been interpreted to give the patentee the right to license or refuse to license
as he chooses. See, e.g., Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., Inc. 297 F. Supp. 489(N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd, 438 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971), wherein the district court stated:
Plaintiff has no duty to grant a license to defendant under the patent in suit,
merely because defendant had requested such a license. A patent owner has the
right to grant a license to some, as he chooses, without granting a license to others.
Id. at 509.
34. Some early commentators have posited otherwise. For example, it was sug-
gested that a patent is "a private stake in the public domain." W. HAMILTON, PATENTS
AND FREE ENTERPRISE 51 (TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 31, 1941). Others have suggested
that patents are "a franchise issued to foster and increase trade for the benefit of the
public." Meyers & Lewis, The Patent "Franchise" and the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO.
L.J. 117, 123 (1941). Even the Supreme Court stated that it was "a privilege which
is conditioned by a public purpose." Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320
U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
However, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1944),
the Court unequivocally stated: "[t]hat a patent is property, protected against appro-
COMMENTS
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right of individuals to own, enjoy and dispose of private property. 5
This right is especially important where the patentee has neither the
financial means nor the business acumen to successfully exploit the
patent himself. Thus, if limitations are placed on the patentee's right
to dispose of his patent, he will have effectively been denied the full
enjoyment of his patent property. More importantly, public interest
is not served if the patentee is unable to market it himself or dispose
of his property to others who will."'
No serious proposals have been advanced questioning the patentee's
right to sell or license his patent. However, the right to license patent
property to whomever the patentee pleases has been challenged in a
recommendation of the White House Task Force which would require
that "a patent which has been licensed by one person shall be made
available to all other qualified applicants on equivalent terms. 1  The
Task Force felt that such a proviso would prevent a patentee from
granting preferential treatment to one group, thereby creating a monop-
oly broader than the patent itself.88 Since pure unilateral refusals to
deal have been held legal, 9 this proposed treatment of licensing implies
a suspicion of agreement between the patentee and the preferred group
to suppress competition and maintain prices in a substantial number of
cases. Besides ignoring the possibility that the patentee may have legiti-
mate business reasons which justify his refusal to license, 40 such a
blanket requirement is unnecessary because concerted refusals to deal
have long been held to be illegal in the patentee-licensee situation.4'
priation both by individuals and the government, has long been settled." Congress put
an end to debate on the matter by providing that "patents shall have the attributes of
personal property." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part:
[NIor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
36. See note 29 supra. Such a suppression of the patented invention to the detri-
ment of the public would be ironic in view of the purpose of the patent grant, which
is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." See note 4 supra.
37. WHITE HoUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 22, at 3.
38. Id. at 4. In addition, the court in Allied Research Prods., Inc. v. Heatbath
Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill. 1964), stated that a refusal to grant licenses to other
parties was "unfair discrimination." However, it is unclear from the record whether
it was a purely vertical refusal to deal or whether there were horizontal aspects.
39. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). The Court stated:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman]
act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged
in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal ....
40. For example, the patentee may refuse a license to a prospective licensee
because of the latter's poor distribution, unimaginative marketing approach or past
record of poor servicing after the sale.
41. The landmark decision outlawing concerted refusals to deal was Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). Since
then, the courts have applied this doctrine to patent situations and held it to be an
unlawful conspiracy for a patentee to agree with his licensee that he would not, without
the licensee's consent, grant further licenses to any other person. See, e.g., United
States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 5(1957) ; United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd,
343 U.S. 444 (1952).
[VOL. 17
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Furthermore, in the event that a refusal to license can be shown to be
a violation of the antitrust laws, the remedy of compulsory licensing
is available.4 2
There is also a distinct possibility that such a provision would have
a depressant effect on the stimulus to invent superior products. If a
rival of the patentee knows the product will be made available to him
anyway, he will be more inclined to forego the risk and expense of
independent development of a superior product, and simply wait for
access to the patent.
4 8
Although section 261 of the Patent Code44 explicitly permits the
patentee to "grant and convey an exclusive right," in view of the White
House Task Force's pressure for change, a court might be inclined to
construe this provision as applying only to outright assignments and
not licenses.4 5 In light of this possibility, it would be beneficial to clarify
section 261 to emphasize that the patentee has the right to license by
exclusive or non-exclusive arrangement with the parties of his choice. 46
Care should be taken, however, in draftsmanship to indicate that the
decision must be a unilateral one with legitimate business reasons, and
not a concerted agreement with other licensees. 47 The statute might
take the following form:
A patent holder may, at his election, license by exclusive or non-
exclusive arrangement with the party or parties of his choice, where
reasonable to the enjoyment and benefit of his patent.
If enacted as suggested, such a clarification would guarantee that the
present patent-antitrust balance between the businessman's needs in se-
42. See, e.g., Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 449 (1952) ; United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 94 (1950) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386, 417, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
43. As the court stated in James P. Marsh Corp. v. U.S. Gauge Co., 129 F.2d
161, 165 (7th Cir. 1942):
It must be admitted that in an effort to avoid infringement of a patent, as
much skill is often displayed as is shown in the conception or development of the
invention itself. There is, however, nothing objectionable in this. In fact, it is
thus that the patent system is working at its best. For it is then that we have
competition between a holder of a legal monopoly and his competitors. It illustrates
how the legal monopoly evidenced by a patent excites the competitors to their best
to meet or excel the product covered by the existing patent. Competition among
industrial rivals and inventors is thus incited.
44. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
45. In fact, one court made such an observation in dictum. See Allied Research
Prods., Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656, 657 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
46. On March 19, 1971, Senator Hugh Scott introduced Amendment No. 24[hereinafter cited as the Scott Amendment] to the McClellan Bill for revision of the
patent laws. S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 261(b) (2) (1971). The proposal provides
in pertinent part that:
An applicant, patentee, or his legal representative may also, at his election . . .
license . . . his rights under a patent . . . by exclusive or non-exclusive arrange-
ments with a party or parties of his choice.
Id.
47. The proposed Scott Amendment uses the language "at his election," implying
that the decision not to license must be a unilateral one and not an agreement with
other licensees. However, the language should be made more explicit on this point.
COMMENTS
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lecting his licensees48 and the maintenance of competition within the
terms of the antitrust laws is maintained.
B. Licensing Less Than the Entire Right
To Make, Use, and Sell
1. Geographical Limitations
Presently, unilateral allocation of markets by the patentee to his
licensees is considered to be within the patent grant.49 Although some
courts have attacked other licensing restrictions, none have held that a
simple territorial division was illegal.50
The territorial division is often the only way the patentee may
derive an economic benefit from his patent property. For example, the
patentee may not have the capabilities to develop and market his product
on a nationwide scale. Moreover, none of his prospective licensees may
be large enough to develop the market fully. Therefore, to benefit through
increased royalties, the patentee may license people in different areas,
each of whom will market fully in that area. This allocation of territory
will also benefit the public, inasmuch as the invention is made available
to everyone. However, where there is not a legitimate business reason
for the division and its effect is harmful rather than beneficial to the
48. Selection of a subpar licensee; i.e., poor distribution, poor sales approach, or
inadequate servicing after sale, can harm the patentee's remaining interests in the
patent. The WHITE HousE TASK FORCE proposals suggest licensing of parties who
are financially responsible and of good reputation. However, a prospective licensee
could meet this description and still damage the patent owner's remaining rights.
Moreover, needless litigation could develop over whether a prospective licensee fits
that description.
An argument could be made that the proposal would simply legitimize what
is already standard procedure, because frequently when a party is denied a license, it
simply infringes. By the time the case is tried, the infringing party will have mar-
keted the product to his full satisfaction. The measure of damages suggested by the
statute is a "reasonable royalty," so the infringing party effectively becomes a licensee
by his actions. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1970). Such an argument is specious, however, since
it could be used to approve violation of any contract provision.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970). This section provides in part that the "patentee . . .
may . . . convey an exclusive right under his . . . patent . . . to the whole or any
specified part of the United States."
50. See, e.g., Suydam v. Day, 23 F. Cas. 473, 474 (No. 13,654) (C.C.S.D. N.Y.
1846). This is one of the earliest cases which discussed territorial restrictions. The
court cast doubt on every licensing restriction, except territorial divisions, stating,
"[tihe subject matter of a patent is not partible except in respect to territorial assign-
ments." See also Brownell v. Kitcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir.
1954), where the court stated, "[ilt is a fundamental rule of patent law that the owner
of a patent may license another and prescribe territorial limitations." The Attorney
General's Committee was in agreement, stating:
Most members feel, however, that there is no doubt of the right of a patentee to
place territorial restrictions upon his assignee or licensee within the United States.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 237. For more recent cases uphold-
ing territorial limitations, see Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 160 F.
Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp.
118 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
[VOL. 17
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public, the patentee would be getting an unreasonable reward from his
patent and will be subject to antitrust sanction.51
The foregoing discussion indicates that presently a rule of reason
applies to territorial licenses so that their use is not unlawful except in
particular circumstances where they unreasonably restrain competition.
Thus, a balance is struck between the patentee's right to full economic
enjoyment of his property and the maintenance of competition as en-
visioned by the antitrust laws.
Division of territories not involving patents are subject to a standard
different than the rule of reason approach applied to patents. Horizontal
territorial restraints are per se illegal since United States v. Sealy, Inc., 52
while vertical territorial restraints may be in danger of the same fate.53
Patents fall into a separate category primarily because of the language
of section 26154 which apparently permits a licensee to license with
territorial restrictions.
Thus, any contention that section 261 was not intended to apply to
territorial licensing restrictions threatens to place such allocations under
the Sealy rule of per se illegality, relating to horizontal territorial restric-
tions, and the uncertainty of vertical territorial restrictions produced by
White Motor Co. v. United States.5 5 A position has been taken by one
commentator that the first patent section dealing with territorial restric-
tions enacted in 183656 was intended to deal only with assignments and
not licenses.5 7 As a result of technical modifications in subsequent acts
51. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947), where theCourt struck down territorial divisions which went beyond the patentee's reasonable
reward. It stated that:
[The Court has] an obligation to give effect to the provisions, on the one hand,
of the patent laws granting certain valuable rights in the nature of monopolies to
the patentees and their licensees, and also to give effect, on the other hand, to
the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibiting any combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade among the several states or with foreign nations.
Id. at 335.
52. 388 U.S. 350 (1967). The Court stated with regard to horizontal territorial
divisions:
Within settled doctrine, they are unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act without
the necessity for an inquiry in each particular case as to their business or economic
justification, their impact in the marketplace, or their reasonableness.
Id. at 357-58.
53. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The White Court
stated that not enough information was available on vertical territorial restraints to
determine if they were so lacking in redeeming value as to be classified as per se
violations of the Sherman Act. Id. at 263.
54. See note 49 supra.
55. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See note 53 supra.
56. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117. This section provides:[E]very patent shall be assignable in law, either as to the whole interest, or any
undivided part thereof, by any assignment in writing; which assignment and also
every other grant . . . of the exclusive right . . . to make and use, and to grant
to others to make and use, the thing patented within and throughout any specified
part . . . of the United States, shall be recorded in the Patent Office ....
57. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 349-52 (1966).
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passed in 1870,58 1875,11 1897,60 . 194161 and the present act passed in
1952,62 section 261 on its face would include both assignments and
licenses. Yet, it is urged that the position is erroneous in view of the
original wording of the statute,63 and the lack of any evidence that Con-
gress subsequent to 1836 intended to legitimize territorial licensing
restrictions. 64
By taking this position, the patentee is stripped of any exemption
from the antitrust principles relating to territorial restrictions. It is sub-
mitted that a rule of per se illegality would be inappropriate in the patent
context because there are situations in which territorial allocations will
be dictated by business necessity, and, at tke same time, will not restrain
competition. As discussed previously, this would occur in a situation
where none of the prospective licensees had the marketing facilities to
effectuate a nationwide license. In this case, the patentee's royalty returns
would be smaller than necessary and the product would be generally
unavailable to the public, unless the patentee grants licenses to several
licensees who could effectively market in their respective areas. Because
of this situation and others that may arise where there is a legitimate
reason for territorial licensing, section 261 should be amended to legiti-
mize territorial licensing where reasonable under the circumstances.65
The following language is suggested:
A patent holder may, at his election, license his riqhts under his
patent for the whole or any part of the United States to the parties
of his choice, where reasonable to the enjoyment and benefit of his
patent.
58. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 36, 16 Stat. 198.
59. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 4898 (1875).
60. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 5, 29 Stat. 692.
61. Act of Aug. 18, 1941, ch. 370, 55 Stat. 634.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
63. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117. See note 56 supra.
64. One commentator takes the position that:
The section should be given the full import intended for it. The assignee of
an exclusive territorial right has "property" and may sue for infringement within
his territory. His document should be interpreted by the suppletive rules appro-
priate to assignments, and so forth. But to allow this section to preclude intelli-
gent harmonization of divergent objectives of the patent and antitrust laws would
be to parody the process of statutory interpretation. The statutory phrase ante-
dates the Sherman Act by more than fifty years, and neither at the time of its
passage nor at any time during the interim hundred forty years has Congress
given any evidence that the language represented a considered judgment on the
substantive propriety of territorial restrictions and their economic consequences.
On its face the section leaves untouched the validity of territorial restrictions in
licenses; it should be construed as irrelevant to the substantive validity of similar
restrictions in assignments.
Baxter, supra note 57, at 351-52 (footnotes omitted).
65. The Scott Amendment would bring about such a result. S. 643, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 261(b) (2) (1971). See note 46 supra. This proposal, however, fails to
provide that such a license would not be legal where its effect would be to restrain
trade and, thus, could be interpreted as a blanket authorization to make territorial
restrictions under any circumstances. To avoid needless litigation requiring an exami-
nation of Congressional intent, any amendment similar to that above should be enacted
with an additional clause providing that territorial provisions will be valid where
reasonable to the enjoyment of the patent.
[VOL. 17
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/2
FEBRUARY 1972]
2. Field of Use Licensing Limitations
Field of use licensing refers to a practice where the patentee re-
stricts a licensee in the use he may make of the patent. For example, a
patented drug may have utility both as a pharmaceutical and as a cos-
metic. The patentee may allow his licensee to use the patent in only one
of the fields.
Presently, in contrast to territorial limitations, no statutory provi-
sion can be cited specifically protecting field of use restrictions. How-
ever, since the Supreme Court's affirmance of field of use restrictions
in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 60 numerous
lower federal courts have, upheld similar provisions. 7 Only where the
restriction has been used as part of an anticompetitive scheme has it
been held illegal.6 8 It seems safe to say then that at the present time a
field of use restriction is valid and the burden would be on the party
alleging an antitrust violation to show the anticompetitive result. This
rule of reason approach is justified by sound business reasons for the
restrictions. 9 To give one example, the patentee may entice more licensees
66. 305 U.S. 124 (1938). The Court considered the issue summarily, stating:
That a restrictive license is legal seems clear . . . . As was said in United States
v. General Electric Co .... the patentee may grant a license "upon any condition
the performance of which is reasonably within the reward to which the patentee
by the grant of a patent is entitled to secure." The restriction here imposed is of
that character. The practice of granting licenses for a restricted use is an old
one . . . . So far as appears, its legality has never been questioned.
Id. at 127 (citations omitted).
67. Simple field of use restriction in patent licenses have been held valid. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 183 F.2d 953 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
896 (1950); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 176 F.2d 799
(1st Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Barr Rubber Prods.
Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Chemagro Corp. v.
Universal Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tex. 1965) ; Benger Labs., Ltd. v. R.K.
Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 317 F.2d 455 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963) ; Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., 204 F.
Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co.,
106 F. Supp. 819 (N.D.W. Va. 1952), aff'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 574 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
In addition, the Attorney General's Committee recognized the continuing
vitality of General Talking Pictures in stating that field of use restrictions were valid.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 236.
68. Field of use restrictions have been held illegal where they have been used:
(1) to allocate markets among competitors: United States v. National Lead Co., 332
U.S. 319 (1947) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) ; (2)
to impose quantity restrictions: United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364
(1948); (3) to allocate customers: United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp.,
291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
69. One commentary has suggested some commonplace and legitimate reasons for
field of use licensing: (1) testing the utility of the invention in one field while collect-
ing information for a general licensing policy; (2) inability to determine the value of
patents in fields not embodied in the license; (3) maintaining exclusivity by the
licensee in his field; (4) fitting the needs and production or marketing capabilities
of the licensee; and (5) holding down the royalty rates for licensees in certain fields.
Oppenheim & Scott, Limitations in Domestic Patent and Know-How Licensing, 14
IDEA 193, 202 (1970). See also Austern, Fish Traps, Indians, and Patents: The Anti-
trust Validity of Patent License Restrictions on Sales Price, Field of Use, Quantity,
and Territory, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 188-90 (1966).
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who are willing to be limited to a specific use in return for lower
royalty rates. Indeed, the great frequency with which the field of use
restriction is employed indicates its value to business.7 0
However, this rule of reason approach has been challenged by the
Justice Department 71 which would permit licensing restrictions only if
the following questions could be answered affirmatively: (1) Is the pro-
vision justifiable as necessary to the patentee's exploitation of his lawful
monopoly? (2) Are there no less restrictive alternatives available which
are more likely to foster competition available to the patentee?
In effect, the Justice Department is postulating a rule of necessity
to replace the rule of reason.12 It is submitted that such a position fails
to consider the rationale and justification for the practice in the patent
context. The patentee is entitled to full exploitation of his patent monop-
oly with the only limitation being that he may not extend his monopoly
beyond the scope of his patent,73 as for example, if he refused to grant
a license in order to put the licensee at a competitive disadvantage to his
competitors. So long as the patentee's conduct does not additionally
involve a restraint of trade,74 it is submitted that he is acting within his
legitimate patent monopoly, 75 and need not justify the restriction as
absolutely necessary.
To guarantee retention of the rule of reason with respect to field of
use licensing, an addition to the patent laws is in order, legitimizing field
70. The survey conducted by Messrs. Oppenheim and Scott indicates that 70%
of the patent holders engage in some aspect of field of use licensing. Oppenheim &
Scott, supra note 69, at 202.
71. See note 24 supra.
72. This seems to be the theory of a series of cases recently initiated by the Anti-
trust Division of the Justice Department concerning the licensing of pharmaceuticals.
Testimony of Alan S. Ward, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Com-
mission, presenting the views of the Federal Trade Commission on the Scott Amend-
ment, Hearings on S. 643 Before the Subcom. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 n.l (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings].
73. As the Court observed in General Talking Pictures:
[T]he patentee may grant a license "upon any condition the performance of which
is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is
entitled to secure."
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938).
74. Examples of proscribed restraints would include horizontal division of mar-
kets, quantity restrictions or customer allocations. See note 68 supra.
75. As one noted commentator has suggested:
So long as the patentee acts unilaterally, negotiates vertically with each ex-
clusive licensee, does not restrict the licensee's activity outside the granted field
of use, and does not attempt to exercise control over the product after a valid
first sale within the authorized field of use, such a practice does not transgress
patent law policy. Any challenge of such conduct should be made under the anti-
trust laws by proving horizontal or vertical restraints on competition outside the
scope of the patent grant.
Oppenheim, supra note 5, at 12 (footnotes omitted).
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of use licensing where reasonable under the circumstances. 76  The fol-
lowing provision is suggested:
A patent holder may, at his election, license all or any part of his
rights under his patent to the parties of his choice, where reasonable
to the enjoyment and benefit of his patent.
3. Price Restrictions
While no statutory language condones price restrictions on licenses,
courts have followed the rule of reason approach set down in United
States v. General Electric Co.77 There, the Court allowed the patentee
to fix the prices at which his licensee could sell, stating that this was a
condition of sale "normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary
reward for the patentee's monopoly. 7 8
Since this decision, courts have repeatedly distinguished General
Electric and found antitrust violations, reducing it to a narrow ambit. 79
76. The proposed Scott Amendment provides in pertinent part that:
An applicant, patentee, or his legal representative may also, at his election, waive
or grant, by license or otherwise, the whole or any part of his rights under
a patent ....
S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 261(b) (2) (1971). On its face, this language could be
used to legitimatize conduct which would have an anticompetitive result, thus leading
to needless litigation and requiring the study of the statutory history. A more satis-
factory proposal was suggested by the Department of Commerce, which provided:
No patent owner or applicant for patent shall be guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of patent rights solely because he licenses less than all the rights which
might be licensed under his patent or application for patent, including rights to
less than all of the territory, patent term, uses, forms, quantities, or numbers of
operations which might be licensed.
Letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce to Senator James
0. Eastland expressing the view of the Department of Commerce with respect to
S. 643, May 10, 1971, at 39 (emphasis added). This wording, while legitimizing field
of use licensing, does not give approval to all its aspects. In effect, the language
preserves the property rights of the patentee, while recognizing the application of
the antitrust laws in situations where a restriction outside the scope of the patent
is involved.
77. 272 U.S. 476 (1926). The Court was careful to distinguish the licensor-
licensee situation from the seller-purchaser situation. While condoning the former,
the Court stated with respect to the latter:
It is only when ...he steps out of the scope of his patent rights and seeks to
control and restrain those to whom he has sold his patented articles in their sub-
sequent disposition of what is theirs, that he comes within the operation of the
Antitrust Act.
Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 490.
79. For example, it has been held that a patentee cannot fix the prices of his
licensee's products if the patent covers only part of the product. See United States v.
General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Nor can he fix prices if his
patent covers the process and machine used in making the product, but not the product
itself. See Barber-Colman Co. v. National Tube Co., 136 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1943).
Nor may he fix prices where there is more than one license. See Newburgh Moire
Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956). Furthermore, prices cannot
be fixed by patent owners participating in a cross-licensing arrangement. See United
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
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While the decision still has some vitality, 0 precisely how much is
unclear."'
It is submitted that a rule of reason approach is appropriate re-
garding price restrictions on licenses. Since the patentee has the right
to exclude others from making, using or selling his product,8 2 it would
seem to follow that when he surrenders any part of the right he may
place restrictions on what he surrenders, where the restraint imposed is
within the scope of his patent grant. For example, the patentee may
establish a minimum price as a condition of his license to remove the
temptation for the licensee to reduce prices and cut corners in production
and warranty servicing. Otherwise, a licensee might be tempted to make
a quick profit under his license by selling a great volume of defective
products at low prices while at the same time destroying the value of
the rights the patentee has retained. Clearly such a restriction would
be within the patent grant.88 Because of this and similar situations that
might arise, a blanket condemnation of price restrictions by making
them per se unlawful is completely inappropriate,8 4 and the' rule of
reason should be retained.
80. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co., 179 F.2d 139 (4th
Cir. 1950). Here, the court upheld a licensing agreement which provided that the
licensee would not undersell the patentee. In Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets
Devices, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 676, 686 (E.D. Mo. 1953), the court stated that a patentee
had a right to fix the licensee's selling price in the absence of evidence showing a
division of the market to any competitor's damage.
81. The limitations on General Electric, (see note 79 supra), have prompted some
commentators to suggest that the doctrine of General Electric is already dead or in
imminent danger of being overturned. See statement of Professor John C. Stedman,
Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 8, wherein it was remarked:
The 45 year old statement in General Electric has been withering on the
vine virtually ever since it was enunciated. It should be allowed to die and be
given a decent burial, not be subjected to artificial resuscitation.
For similar remarks, see Testimony of Ass't Att'y Gen'l Richard W. McLaren, Senate
Hearings, supra note 72, at 18. But see the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, supra
note 5, at 235, where it was stated:
We think, however, that in the absence of horizontal agreement among licensees,
or any plan aimed at or resulting in industry-wide price fixing, licenses with price
fixing provisions fall within the orbit of the patent and need not run afoul of
the antitrust laws.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970).
83. On the other hand, it would not be within the patentee's patent grant to use
the price restrictions to put the licensee at a competitive disadvantage. For example,
this could occur in a situation where the patentee also manufactures the product him-
self. By imposing as a term in the license that the licensee may not sell at a price
lower than the patentee, the parties have agreed to suppress competition between them.
This type of restriction is beyond the scope of the patent and should be subject to
the antitrust laws. Such an agreement would be unrealistic, however, because the
patentee is entitled to a royalty payment whether he sells the product himself or the
licensee does. For other court-imposed restrictions, see note 79 supra.
84. A classification of per se illegality is only justified where the conduct lacks
any redeeming value. As stated by the Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958) :
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming sirtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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Because the rule of reason approach of General Electric to price
restrictions in patents is in danger of being overturned,8 5 a statutory
provision should be added to the patent laws retaining this right.80
Such a provision might read:
A patent holder may, at his election, as a condition of the license,
determine the price at which his licensee may sell, where reason-
able to the enjoyment and benefit of his patent.
4. Quantity Restrictions
As with price restrictions, there is no statutory language specifically
permitting a patentee to impose quantity restrictions on his licensee.
However, the practice has been approved by a number of courts8 7
where there were no further restrictions on the licensee.8 8
In effect, then, courts have applied a rule of reason approach to
licenses with quantity restrictions, a view more appropriate than an
alternative rule of per se illegality. Under the prevailing rule, where
the restriction is not agreed upon in order to restrain competition, but
is "normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for
the patentee's monopoly,"8 9 it is within his patent grant and is not an
antitrust violation. For example, the patentee may impose quantity
restrictions on the licensee while he determines whether the licensee
will provide adequate warranty servicing. Otherwise the licensee could
quickly sell a great quantity of products, just as quickly go out of
business, and leave a trail of dissatisfied buyers. This could hurt the
85. The Supreme Court split 4-4 on the question of the validity of license price
fixing. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). It again split 4-4
on the same question after the Government's procedural error of waiving, in the trial
court, any intention of challenging the merits of General Electric. United States v.
Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965). Otherwise, General Electric might have been
overturned then and there. For a more complete discussion, see Gibbons, Field
Restrictions in Patent Transactions: Economic Discrimination and Restraint of
Competition, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 423, 456 n.93 (1966).
86. The Scott Amendments included the following proposal:
No patent owner shall be guilty of misuse or illegal extension of patent rights
because he has entered into or will enter only into-
(2) an arrangement granting rights under the patent that excludes or restricts
conduct in a manner that is reasonable under the circumstances to secure
to the patent owner the full benefit of his invention and patent grant.
S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 271(f) (1971). This language or a provision substan-
tially similar would retain the rule of reason approach with regard to price restrictions.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) ; Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1
(E.D. Pa, 1958), aft'd. 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959);
United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953),
aff'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) ; Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson,
109 F. Supp. 657 (D.N.J. 1951), aff'd, 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 935 (1954).
88. For example, where the limitation also extends to the production of un-
patented products, the courts have found an unreasonable restraint of trade. American
Equip. Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934) ; United States
v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949). Also, where the restriction is
part of a cross-licensing agreement, in effect it becomes an agreement not to compete.
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
89. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
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reputation of the product and severely harm the remaining rights of
the patentee.90
Although there is no specific attack on quantity restriction in patent
licenses at this time, the "rule of necessity" standard of legality pro-
posed by the Antitrust Division 9 ' could result in applications of a more
stringent standard. Therefore, it is submitted that legislation should be
drafted permitting a patentee to impose quantity restrictions on his
licensee where reasonable under the circumstances . 2 Its form could
be as follows:
A patent holder may, at his election, as a condition to a license,
determine the number of products produced by his licensee, where
reasonable to the enjoyment and benefit of his patent.
C. Requiring as Consideration from the Licensee a Grant-
Back of All Improvement Patents
At the present time, the legality of grant-back license provisions93
is somewhat in doubt. Since Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. (Trans-
wrap) v. Stokes & Smith Co. 4 upheld an assignment-back license pro-
vision, some courts have found antitrust violations where grant-back
provisions were part of an illegal combination. 5 The most serious
90. On the other hand, if the restriction is agreed to in order to limit production
and keep the price of each product sold higher, such an arrangement would be, in
effect, an agreement to fix prices so as to restrain trade and should be an antitrust
violation. However, such an arrangement would be economically unrealistic. The
patentee has a lawful monopoly on the product, so that all the products sold, whether
by himself or his licensee, will bring in a royalty payment to him, proportional to the
selling price. Therefore it should be of little consequence to him whether this royalty re-
sults from a smaller quantity at higher prices, or a larger quantity sold at lower prices.
91. See text accompanying note 24 supra. In addition, a former head of the Anti-
trust Division has suggested prohibiting price and quantity restrictions on the ground
that they have no redeeming value. Turner, supra note 4, at 154.
92. The language of the proposed Scott Amendment § 271 (f) (2) would retain
the rule of reason approach to quantity limitations. See note 86 supra. Procedurally
this would place the burden of showing an unreasonable restraint on the party chal-
lenging the restriction.
93. The Attorney General's Committee defined grant-backs as follows:
Grant back covenants, sometimes included in patent licenses, provide for
license or assignment to the licensor of any improvement patented by the licensee
in the products or processes of the licensed patent.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 227.
94. 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
95. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; United States v.
General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953) ; United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
On the other hand, some courts have held grant-backs valid. Zajicek v. Kool-
vent Metal Awning Corp. of America, 283 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Binks Mfg. Co. v.
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. dismissed as
not warranted on record, 366 U.S. 211 (1961); Old Dominion Box Co. v. Continental
Can Co., 273 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 171 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 285
F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960) ; International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp.
551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 139
F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1956) ; Modern Art Printing Co. v. Skeels, 123 F. Supp. 426
(D.N.J. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 223 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1955).
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threat to Transwrap is raised by implication in Brulotte V. Thvs Co.,96
where the Court pointed out that a tying arrangement is more general
than the exclusion of competition in the tied product; it extends to any
projection of the monopoly power of the patentee beyond the life of the
patent.97  Since the improvement patent to be granted back will of
necessity extend beyond the lifetime of the parent patent,98 arguably
the grant-back extends the monopoly of the original patent beyond 17
years, and is thus a tying arrangement subject to per se illegality.
It is contended that a per se rule is appropriate only when the
grant-back is to be exclusive since non-exclusive grant-backs are suf-
ficiently justified by legitimate business considerations so as to call for
a rule of reason approach.
The justification for grant-backs is that the patentee's product
may become obsolete through an improvement on the basic patent.
Ordinarily a refinement in the area of the original invention is de-
pendent upon and necessarily requires a license of the basic patent. In
this situation, the holder of the basic patent has power to demand a
license under the improvement patent in exchange for a license under
his basic patent. Quite often, however, the improvement will be de-
veloped by the party who has previously taken a license under the basic
patent. Since the licensee already has the right to use the basic patent,
the patentee has no power to demand a license under the improvement.
If the improvement renders his patent obsolete, he is no longer able to
compete and his patent is effectively rendered worthless. This is par-
ticularly true where the patentee is a small company and the licensee is
relatively large with well-developed research facilities. The only form
of protection which would assure the patentee access to the improve-
ment is a grant-back provision in the original license.9 9 In a situation
such as described above, an antitrust sanction would be inappropriate
because such an arrangement would benefit the public by ensuring com-
petiton between a minimum of two parties.
However, where the provision is an exclusive license-back, the
policy argument above would fail since the basic patentee is doing more
than ensuring his competitive position in the market. He is limiting
96. 379 U.S. 29 (1964). The Court held that provisions in a license agreement for
royalty payments beyond the life of the patent were illegal per se as a tying arrange-
ment. Id. at 32.
97. Id. at 33. The Court stated:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate
with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those
royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge
the monopoly of the patent by tieing [sic] the sale or use of the patented article
to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.
Id.
98. The statutory patent grant is a 17 year period. See note 2 supra.
99. For a more complete discussion, see Chevigny, The Validity of Grant-Back
Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 34 FORDHAm L. REV. 569 (1966) ; Stedman,
Acquisition of Patents and Know-How By Grant, Fraud, Purchase and Grant-Back,
28 U. PITT. L. REv. 161, 168-72 (1966).
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the potential number of competitors to two, and the license becomes,
in effect, an agreement to restrain competition in the improvement
patent, which is beyond his rights under his basic patent. Where the
license provision calls for an assignment-back, the basic patentee has
even eliminated the improvement patentee and is left with no competi-
tion at all. Stripped of any justification, exclusive license-backs and
assignment-backs are blatant tying arrangements and a rule of per se
illegality is justified. In Transwrap, however, the Court held that the
assignment-back was not a classic tying arrangement. Since both the
tying and tied products were patents, the patentee was simply using one
legalized monopoly to acquire another legalized monopoly.100 It is
posited, however, that holding a legalized monopoly does not privilege
a patentee to use it as a lever to obtain an exclusive grant-back of some-
one else's legalized monopoly. Whether the tied product is patented
or unpatented is irrelevant - in either case the patentee is unlawfully
enlarging the scope of his monopoly. 101
Where the licensing provision calls for a non-exclusive grant-back,
a rule of reason should apply. As discussed previously, such a pro-
vision guarantees that the patentee will be able to compete and en-
hances competition by ensuring the presence of one more competitor in
the market. It should be noted, however, that even where the grant-
back is non-exclusive, the patentee is still extending his patent monopoly
beyond its original coverage. Therefore, the grant-back license is not
flatly excluded from operation of the antitrust laws by the scope of the
basic patent grant; instead, it must be justified on the ground that it
will not unreasonably restrain competition. For this reason, the Anti-
trust Division10 2 is seemingly justified in applying its "rule of neces-
sity"'10 to grant-backs. Under this view, the patentee must show that
there are no less restrictive alternatives available to him which are
more likely to foster competition, and must also show the provision is
necessary for the full use and enjoyment of his patent. In light of these
criteria, the following factors must be considered: (1) Whether the
patentee is competing, or is likely to compete with his licensees. If the
two are not in competition, the justification for the provision of re-
100. 329 U.S. at 644.
101. See note 97 supra.
102. The head of the Antitrust Division has stated:
For example, we contemplate challenging under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
patent licenses which require an assignment grantback of all improvement patents.
It is our view that the right to a nonexclusive license back on improvements may
be a legitimate provision in the licensing of a basic patent but that a grantback
requirement tends unduly to extend the patent monopoly and to stifle research and
development efforts on the part of licensees, contrary to the public interest.
Although we think it is distinguishable, the Supreme Court's Trans-Wrap de-
cision will in some degree be called into question by this challenge.
McLaren, supra note 24, at 63.
103. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
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taining an ability to compete is weakened. 10 4 (2) The relative size of
the patentee and the prospective licensee. If the size of the patentee
company is very small compared to the size and resources of the
licensee, then the patentee legitimately needs the protection of a grant-
back provision to remain competitive) . 05 (3) The likelihood that the
patentee would develop the improvement himself in the absence of the
grant-back provision. If the patentee is possessed of sufficient resources
to develop the improvement himself, the necessity of the grant-back
provision is lessened. Moreover, the existence of the provision may
actually blunt the patentee's impulse toward further development. (4)
The number of licensees. Where there are a great number, there is a
strong likelihood that the original patentee will have access to a great
number of improvements. Even though the license-back is non-exclusive
in the absence of extensive cross-licensing, he will be the only party with
access to all the improvements developed. This gives him a competitive
advantage over all competitors and does more than merely preserve his
ability to compete.'06 (5) The scope of the grant-back provision. Where
the licensee is required to grant-back not only improvements complemen-
tary to the original patent, but also any development related to the original
patent, the patentee is not solely maintaining his competitive posture:
rather, he is using his monopoly to gain a competitive advantage over the
entire industry.
To reflect these considerations, the patent laws should be amended
to provide that exclusive grant-backs are an illegal extension of patent
rights, and that non-exclusive grant-backs will be judged by the anti-
trust rule of reason.' 0 7 The following language is suggested:
A patent holder may, at his election, as a condition of a license,
require as part of his consideration a non-exclusive grant back of
patent rights, where necessary to preserve full use and enjoyment of
his patent rights.
104. Of course, as one commentator points out, the patentee may still have alegitimate interest in a grant-back provision; it makes his patent more valuable in the
event he decides to assign it to someone else. Chevigny, supra note 99, at 583.
105. It has been suggested that if the apparent trend toward supremacy of the
antitrust laws continues, a grant-back provision would be invalid even in this type
of situation. Oppenheim, supra note 5, at 15.
106. See Chevigny, supra note 99, at 584.
107. The proposed Scott Amendment suggests the following language with regard
to grant-backs:
No patent applicant or patent owner shall be guilty of misuse or illegal ex-
tension of patent rights because he has entered into, or will enter only into, an
arrangement of assignment, license, or waiver of some or all of his rights under
this title for a consideration which includes-(1) a non-exclusive license or waiver of patent rights.
S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 271(g) (1971). This proposed section on its face wouldgive blanket approval to any non-exclusive grant-back no matter what the economic
effect. This provision could be remedied by prefixing the section with: "Where neces-
sary to preserve full use and enjoyment of his patent rights."
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D. Royalty Payments
1. Freely Negotiated Payments
The right of a patentee to charge whatever the traffic will bear to
license his patent would seem beyond discussion. Although there is no
specific statutory authority, this right flows by implication from the per-
sonal property attributes of a patent.'08 Moreover, this right was judici-
ally recognized in United States v. General Electric Co.'0 9 and reaffirmed
in 1964 in Brulotte v. Thys Co." 0
It is posited that a freely negotiated royalty arrangement is justi-
fied for two reasons. First, the market place provides whatever price
controls are needed. Where the royalty rates are too high, the licensee's
selling price is forced to uncompetitive levels. This reduces the num-
ber of products sold and consequently the total royalty payments to the
patentee. For their mutual benefit, the patentee and licensee will rene-
gotiate a lower, more realistic royalty rate. Second, if exorbitant rates
were grounds for a charge of patent misuse, a substantial number of
prospective licensees, dissatisfied with the rate offered, would challenge
the arrangement in court."' Such a frightening potential consequence
would probably discourage many patent holders from licensing at all
and thus deprive the public of the full benefit of their discovery.
No courts have actually held that exorbitant royalty rates were
violative of the antitrust laws. While in American Photocopy Equip-
ment Co. v. Rovico, Inc." 2 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit used language indicating that exorbitant royalty rates violated anti-
trust laws, 113 the court held that the machine on which royalties were
based substantially contained unpatented parts so that the high royalties
were in effect tying the sale or use of the patented article to the sale or
108. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
109. 272 U.S. 476 (1926). The Court stated:
Conveying less than title to the patent, or part of it, the patentee may grant
a license to make, use and vend articles under the specifications of his patent
for any royalty ....
Id. at 489. The Court upheld the right of a patentee to dictate the selling price of the
patented article to his licensee. See notes 77-86 and accompanying text supra.
110. 379 U.S. 29 (1964). The Court stated:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate
with the leverage of that monopoly.
Id. at 33. The Court outlawed royalty payments beyond the expiration of the patent.
See notes 117-24 and accompanying text infra.
111. See Stearns v. Tinker & Rason, 252 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957). There, the
court commented that:
To say that the mere amount of money due and payable for the grant of a
license is subject to judicial review would render each and every agreement made
subject to court approval.
Id. at 605. The court found misuse on other grounds.
112. 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966).
113. Id. at 747. The court stated:
The record before us shows that the license agreements in effect require
plaintiff's licensees to fix a minimum selling price far above the price which they
would otherwise charge and that the royalty policy of plaintiff is in violation of
the antitrust laws of the United States, being exorbitant and oppressive.
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use of the unpatented article.1 4 Nevertheless, the language used was so
loose and unnecessarily broad that a court, at least in the Seventh Circuit,
might feel constrained to follow a literal interpretation of the language.
To preclude this possibility, the patent laws should be amended to ex-
plicitly provide that a patentee may charge whatever amount he desires
for a license under his patent." 5 The following language would ensure
that right:
A patent holder may, at his election, as a condition of his license,
require, as all or part of his consideration, a royalty of any amount,
where reasonable to the enjoyment and benefit of his patent.
2. Payments After the Patent Has Expired
In Brulotte v. Thys Co.," 6 royalty agreements that projected beyond
the expiration date of the patent were classified as per se illegal where,
they were based on post-expiration activities. The Court viewed such
an agreement as a type of tying arrangement in that the patent was being
used as leverage to force payment for use of the product after the
patent has expired. 1 7 The Court's holding appeared to flatly rule out
any deferred payment plans, even where the royalties were based on
pre-expiration activities. There were hints in the decision, however, that
the Court might view the latter situation differently." 8 These hints were
affirmed in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.," 9 where the
Court stated with regard to its holding in Brulotte:
Recognizing that the patentee could lawfully charge a royalty for
practicing a patented invention prior to its expiration date and that
114. Id. at 748.
115. The proposed Scott Amendments provide:
No patent applicant or patent owner shall be guilty of misuse or illegal exten-
sion of patent rights because he has entered into, or will enter into, an arrangement
of assignment, license, or waiver of some or all of his rights under this title for a
consideration which includes . . . a royalty, fee, or purchase price . . . in any
amount ....
S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 7 1(g) (2) (A) (1971).
This language would preserve the right of a patentee to charge whatever the
traffic will bear for a license under his patent. There is no need to codify the holding
of American Photocopy as an illegal tying arrangement under this section. This type
of tying arrangement could be attacked under already existing case law. Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
116. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
117. Id. at 33. The Court stated:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate
with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those
royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge
the monopoly of the patent by tieing [sic] the sale or use of the patented article
to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.
118. At one point in the opinion, the Court stated:
The Supreme Court of Washington held that in the present case the period
during which royalties were required was only "a reasonable amount of time
over which to spread the payments for the use of the patent" . . . . But there is
intrinsic evidence that the agreements were not designed with that limited view.
Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
119. 395 U.S. 100 (1969). The Court's holding was that conditioning the grant
of licenses upon the payment of royalties on unpatented products constitutes patent
misuse. Id. at 140-41.
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the payment of this royalty could be postponed beyond that time,
we noted that the post-expiration royalties were not for prior use
but for current use, and were nothing less than an effort by the
patentee to extend the term of his monopoly beyond that granted
by law.' 20
It is submitted that the right to enter into deferred royalty payments
based on pre-expiration activities should be codified by an amendment
to the patent laws. This will prevent a court from fastening onto the
broad language used in Brulotte and holding all deferred royalty pay-
ments illegal per se. Some commentators have objected to such codi-
fication on the ground that contractual provisions will be drawn up which
will mask royalty payments based on post-expiration activities. 12 1 Ad-
mittedly, a determination of whether a royalty is based on pre-expiration
or post-expiration activities is difficult. However, this difficulty should
not justify failure to provide statutory clarification since there are
occasions where deferred payments are a clear necessity. 122 Quite often
during his first years of production under a patent license, the licensee
is simply unable to pay royalties due to production set-up costs and an
initial small market. Later, after the patent has actually expired, the
set-up costs have been paid, a market is established, and the licensee is
more able to pay. In such an instance, a deferred arrangement only re-
flects economic realities. For this reason, the businessman-patentee is
entitled to some assurance that upon a demonstration on his part that
the royalty payments are based on pre-expiration activity, he will not be
liabe for patent misuse.' 23 The following statutory addition would pro-
vide that assurance:
A patent holder may, as a condition of a license, require, as all or
part of his consideration, a royalty, however paid or measured, pro-
vided that any amount paid after the expiration of a patent is based
solely on pre-expiration activities.
3. Payments Based on the Entire Package
Package licensing refers to a situation where the royalty rate pre-
scribed by the agreement does not segregate the charge for any particular
120. Id. at 136.
121. This was the position taken by the Antitrust Division during the hearings on
the Scott Amendments. See Testimony of Ass't Att'y Gen'l Richard W. McLaren,
Senate Hearings, supra note 72, at 26-27.
122. The situation with regard to pre-issuance royalties is different. Since applica-
tion proceedings in the Patent Office are held in confidence until the patent issues,
in effect the royalties during this period are in payment for a trade secret. Trade
secrets are a proper basis for royalty payments. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,
442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971), noted in 17 VILL. L. REv. 376 (1971). For a more
complete discussion, see Austern, Umbras and Penumbras: The Patent Grant and
Antitrust Policy, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1015, 1019-21 (1965).
123. S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 271(g) (2) (A) (1971). This language would
guarantee the right of deferred payments while recognizing that royalties based on
post-expiration royalties are illegal. This language is consistent with the position of
Brulotte. See note 115 supra.
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patent. 124  Where the package license is entered into voluntarily, the
courts have found no patent misuse.125 However, where the licensee is
compelled, expressly or impliedly, 26 to take a license for the entire pack-
age, the courts have struck down the arrangement as being in the nature
of a tying clause. 2 7
One natural consequence of the package license arrangement is that
royalties will not diminish as individual patents expire. Logically, if the
package license agreement were voluntary and legal when entered into,
the royalty arrangement incident to it should also be legal. However,
courts have not always seen it that way. In Brulotte v. Thys Co.,12 the
Supreme Court held that a provision for royalties beyond the expiration
of the last patent incorporated in the product is illegal as a form of tying
arrangement.1 29 The Court did imply that royalties for package license
arrangements would remain legal so long as some patents remained un-
124. One survey revealed that almost 75 per cent of the companies contacted had
licensing agreements covering more than one patent. Oppenheim & Scott, supra note
69, at 199.
125. As the Court stated in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100 (1969):
If convenience of the parties rather than patent power dictates the total-sales
royalty provision, there are no misuses of the patents and no forbidden conditions
attached to the license.
Id. at 138. Justice Harlan, dissenting, criticizes this standard as unworkable. Id. at 141.
See also Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
126. An implied compulsory license would occur where the patentee offers the
licensee the patents that he really wants at a rate equal to or greater than the asking
price for the entire package the patentee is offering. Hence, there is strong incentive
for the licensee to take the whole package. As when the compulsion is express, the
patentee is using the desired patents as a lever to force the licensee to accept the en-
tire package.
127. As the Court stated in Zenith Radio:
But we do not read Automatic Radio to authorize the patentee to use the
power of his patent to insist on a total-sales royalty and to override protestations
of the licensee that some of his products are unsuited to the patent or that for
some lines of his merchandise he has no need or desire to purchase the privileges
of the patent. In such event, not only would royalties be collected on unpatented
merchandise, but the obligation to pay for nonuse would clearly have its source
in the leverage of the patent.
395 U.S. at 139. See also Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) ; United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) ; International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
There is some question as to the extent of the illegality involved in use of the
tying arrangement in the package licensing situation. The penalty for misuse of patent
is nonenforceability of the patent. See, e.g., American Security Co. v. Shatterproof
Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959). Some Supreme
Court decisions have held in addition that compulsory package licenses are auto-
matically antitrust violations, without any further examination to determine whether
the tying patent itself has sufficient market power to make any tying clause an anti-
trust violation. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949),
where the Court stated: "[a] patent, moreover, although in fact there may be many
competing substitutes for the patented article, is at least prima facie evidence of . . .
[market] control." Id. at 307. Other commentators have felt that an examination of
the entire factual setting is necessary to determine if the patent has enough market
power to create a significant antitrust violation. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE,
supra note 5, at 238.
128. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
129. Id. at 33. See notes 116-23 and accompanying text supra.
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expired. °30 However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc.13 1 used Brulotte
to hold that undiminished royalties are illegal where they continue beyond
expiration of the "most important" patent.1 2
It is submitted that a determination of the "most important" patent
is inappropriate since this may vary according to the needs and intended
uses of each particular licensee. Further, the administration of such a
standard would be difficult because of problems of proof. A more re-
liable test would be to determine whether the arrangement was entered
into voluntarily or involuntarily. Where the arrangement is truly volun-
tary, the licensee by implication has determined that no one patent in the
package is of paramount importance; indeed, it is more important to him
to have the privilege to utilize all the patents in the package. This fre-
quently occurs where the patentee holds a large number of key patents
in a given area of technology. The licensee, planning to market a prod-
uct involving this area of technology, knows that he will need a license
under some of the patents. However, at the planning stage, it is often
impossible for him to tell which patents in a particular area will be
needed. Therefore he will enter into an arrangement with the patentee
to license all of the patents for a period of years at a lower total royalty
than if individual arrangements were made for each patent. The lower
rate will result partly from the saving of bookkeeping expenses which
would be needed to keep records on each patent.
133
If the "most important" patent test is adopted, there is danger that
a licensee could enter into a bargain package license arrangement be-
cause he is unsure which individual patents he will use. Later, when in
operation, he may refuse to pay royalties by claiming that the "most
important" patent has expired. This would allow the licensee the best
of all possible worlds, 34 and the patentee may be hesitant to seek legal
enforcement because of the dangers of an antitrust counterclaim.
Besides this concern, it is submitted that such a test is unnecessary
because if one patent is obviously much more important than the rest
of the package, a presumption would arise that the patentee compelled
130. The Court took note of its decisions in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., and stated that the rule of undiminished royalties could not be
extended to a period beyond expiration of all patents; the implication was that where
some remain unexpired, undiminished royalty arrangements are still proper if volun-
tarily entered into. 379 U.S. at 33. This implication was confirmed in Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). See note 125 supra.
131. 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966).
132. Id. at 681.
133. For a more complete discussion, see Comment, Unreduced Royalty Arrange-
ments and Packaged Patents: An Improper Extension of the Patent Monopoly?, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1248 (1968).
134. In Zenith Radio Corp., the Court observed:
If the licensee negotiates for "the privilege to use any or all of the patents and
developments as [he] desire[s] to use them," . . . he cannot complain that he
must pay royalties if he chooses to use none of them. He could not then charge
that the patentee had refused to license except on the basis of a total-sales royalty.
395 U.S. at 139 (citations omitted).
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the licensee to take the entire package. Thus, such a royalty maintenance
scheme would be illegal under the compulsory-voluntary package test.1 3 5
In support of the proposition that a truly voluntary package should
be valid, it should be noted that the public will actually benefit through
an arrangement of convenience between the patentee and the licensee.
Since the administrative costs will be lower for the patentee if he is not
required to treat patents individually, the consumer will ultimately share
the saving. 1 6 To preserve the right to enter into a voluntary package
license agreement and to overrule Rocform, the patent laws should be
amended to provide that a voluntary package arrangement may be em-
ployed without fear of antitrust implications. 13 7 The following language
is suggested:
A patent holder and his licensee may voluntarily enter into a royalty
arrangement for a number of patents where the royalty is not com-
puted in a manner that segregates the charges for any particular
patent.
4. Payments Which Differ Among Licensees
In situations where the patentee grants non-exclusive licenses to a
number of licensees, he will necessarily negotiate and contract with each
prospective licensee separately. In such instances, it is not unusual for
135. One commentator has suggested that there are situations in which even a
compulsory package license should be valid. Austern, supra note 122, at 1023-24.
This could occur where several patents must be jointly licensed for any commercially
feasible use. In International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 988 (1965), the court held that a mandatory package
license of two patents was not illegal where there was no commercially feasible device
which could be made under one of the patents without infringing the other. Here, there
was particularly strong proof by a showing that no one had ever asked for a license
under one of the patents alone.
136. Where the licensee is forced to accept patents in a package he does not really
want, the royalty will be higher than if he had been permitted to take a license on
only the patent he needed. He will pass this increased cost on to consumers. Thus, in
the compulsory package situation, the public will bear the increased costs and here,
quite correctly, the courts have condemned such practices. See note 127 supra.
137. The proposed Scott Amendments would effectuate this result:
No patent applicant or patent owner shall be guilty of misuse or illegal ex-
tension of patent rights because he has entered into, or will enter only into, an
arrangement of assignment, license, or waiver of some or all of his rights under
this title for a consideration which includes . . . a royalty, fee, or purchase
price . . . not computed in a manner that segregates the charge for any particular
patent, or for any particular claim or claims of one or more patents .
S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 271(g) (2) (C) (1971).
The language used here is sweeping enough to be used to cover compulsory
package licensing. A more acceptable form would embrace the phrase "voluntarily
entered into." This would permit voluntary package licensing while excepting com-
pulsory package licenses.
This language would favorably represent the opinion of the Attorney General's
Committee which stated:
[WIe believe that strictures against package licensing should not be applied to
frustrate good faith license offers. Package licensing should be prohibited only
where there is refusal, after a request, to license less than a complete package ....
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 239-40.
Of course there are instances where even a compulsory package license would
be justified. See note 135 supra. Consequently, even these practices should be legal
where there is a showing of substantial justification.
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the licensing arrangement to be set at different rates for each licensee.
There may be any number of reasons why this occurs. A patentee may
discover that the rate contracted for with his first licensee was low com-
pared to the real value of the license. The establishment of a market by
the first licensee may actually enhance the value of the patent and con-
sequently the royalty rates for a license under it. Conversely, if the first
licensee received the bad side of the bargain, the patentee may discover
that subsequent prospective licensees insist on a lower rate. Even when
two parties seek licenses simultaneously, the license may be worth more
to one than the other, and consequently the patentee may be able to
extract a higher royalty from one than the other. Where differing
royalty rates are assessed because the patentee is maximizing his pecuni-
ary reward, the courts have held them valid.18s This result is consistent
with the principle that the patentee is entitled to consideration "normally
and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's
monopoly."'81 9
On the other hand, some courts have found antitrust violations where
discriminatory royalty rates were charged.140 In those cases, however,
there was evidence that one party was given a lower rate to give it a
competitive edge over the other and, thus, these decisions are consistent
with the right of the patentee to a pecuniary reward for the patent.
The patent granted merely protects the competitive superiority of the
invention; it does not give the patentee the right to favor one competitor
at the expense of another. 14' Hence, the patent grant extends no pro-
tection to these activities and the antitrust laws should freely apply to
find a conspiracy to restrain competition.
The White House Task Force has proposed that all patentees should
be required to grant subsequent licenses on terms "neither more restric-
tive nor less favorable" than the first licenses. 42 The Task Force felt
that such a provision would prevent a patentee from granting preferen-
138. See, e.g., Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 489 (N.D.
Ill. 1968), where the court stated:
A patent owner is not required to grant licenses to all comers at equal rates
and terms. He may select or reject prospective licensees and prefer one over
another for consideration within his discretion.
[Pllaintiff has shown that it was a mistake to grant [a prior licensee] a
license at such a low royalty rate and plaintiff is not required to make the same
mistake again.
Id. at 509.
139. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
140. La Peyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260
F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966) ; Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp.
1019 (D. Alas. 1965). For a comprehensive discussion of La Peyre, see Note, supra
note 31.
141. Naturally, in every instance where several licensees are paying different rates,
the party with the lowest rate has the competitive advantage, but where this is merely
incident to the patentee's attempt to secure his pecuniary reward, there is no intended
harm to competition. It is submitted that in such an instance there should be no
antitrust violation.
142. WHiTE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 22, at 22.
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tial treatment to one group over another.143 While this provision would
prevent preferential treatment, it is submitted that such a provision is
overbroad and unnecessary. Courts have already found antitrust vio-
lations in situations where preference is shown.' 44 Moreover, such a
provision would deny all the legitimate reasons for differing rates.
This proposal creates uncertainty as to the future legality of this
conduct. The patent laws should be amended to reaffirm the right of a
patentee to charge differential royalty rates where incident to enjoyment
of his patent.' 45 The following statutory language would further that
objective:
A patent holder may, at his election, require as consideration a royalty
differing from that provided in arrangements with other licensees,
where such consideration is reasonable to the enjoyment and benefit
of his patent.
III. CONCLUSION
The approach taken by this Comment has been that the balance pres-
ently existing between the patent and antitrust laws should in large
measure be retained. The function of both bodies is to promote com-
petition. Although there is much criticism of the anticompetitive effects
of the patent system, it is difficult to see its deleterious effects on com-
merce in the United States. Since the late nineteenth century, the United
States has experienced unparalleled technological advances. For that
reason, legislation should be enacted to ensure that the rule of reason
approach to patent licensing is retained. To that end, the following
general propositions have been presented: first, that a patentee have
the right to license whomever he wishes and at those terms which are
reasonable to the enjoyment of his patent grant; further, that he be
permitted wide latitude in the mode of permissible compensation for
licensing his patent. Adoption of these proposals, it is submitted, should
help to create a healthy business atmosphere conducive to both tech-
nological innovation and free competition.
N. R. Powers
143. Id. at 23.
144. See note 140 supra.
145. The proposed Scott Amendment states:
No patent applicant or patent owner shall be guilty of misuse or illegal ex-
tension of patent rights because he has entered into, or will only enter into, an
arrangement of assignment, license, or waiver of some or all of his rights under
this title for a consideration which includes . . . a royalty . . . differing from
that provided in some other arrangement.
S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 271(g) (2) (D) (1971). This language is overbroad
in its protection of the patentee and could be used to justify the presently condemned
practice of using differential rates to give one licensee a competitive advantage over
another. This language could be made acceptable by adding a phrase at the end,
"where incident to reasonable enjoyment of his patent."
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